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The Legal Defense Fund's Capital
Punishment Campaign: The Distorting
Influence of Death
I. Introduction
Military jargon sneaks imperceptibly into the vocabulary of the
law when the topic is litigation for social change. The litigation it-
self is styled a "campaign," its theoretical framework a series of "at-
tacks." The planners of these campaigns, to whom many refer as
"fighting the good fight," have been likened by Michael Meltsner to
"those highly trained, specially assembled raider groups which are
occasionally deployed in wartime"' to chart "legal strategy under
battlefield conditions." 2 Jack Greenberg, Director-Counsel of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF or "Fund")
from 1961 through 1984, warns that
[t]he term "campaign" conjures up an image of military precision. But
we will see, time and again, cases take on lives of their own and mature
along unexpected lines. . . .Too much that occurs is not subject to
control, . . .3
Still, a quick glance at the literature on many of the Fund's
projects-campaigns against segregated educational facilities, ra-
cially restrictive covenants, money bail, and others-indicates that
issues of control, of risk, and of costs and benefits have been central
to the decision-making process which has controlled the Fund's
campaign strategies.
During the 1960s and early 1970s the LDF undertook yet another
campaign. The Fund mounted a two-stage attack on the death pen-
alty: first on its imposition for the crime of rape, then on its imposi-
tion for any crime at all. This campaign, however, was not marked
by a decision-making process similar to that which engendered
other LDF projects.
If it is true that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience,"4 the LDF's death penalty campaign set logic against
1. M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 9 (1973).
2. Id.
3. J. GREENBERG, LITIGATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: METHODS, LIMITS, AND ROLE IN
DEMOCRACY 10 (1973).
4. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
158
Legal Defense Fund
experience in a way that no other LDF activity had ever done. The
logic of first attacking the most extreme manifestation of racism in
the criminal justice system, and then of extending that attack to the
death penalty itself, propelled the Fund through its exhausting dec-
ade-long effort. Yet this logic also involved the LDF in a costly cam-
paign for a small group of defendants, many of whom were not only
whites, but whites culled from the most racist segment of society.
This logic therefore placed the Fund at seeming loggerheads with
its own goals, charter, and history; in short, with its own experience.
An equally forceful tension also arose between two different kinds of
experience-legal experience as Fund attorneys and moral experi-
ence as human beings-and blinded the Fund to the institutional
and policy problems which the capital punishment campaign had
created.
Any lawyer who has observed the process by which the state
chooses those it wishes to kill should see a familiar hand at work
here. That hand is the perverting hand of death which twists out of
shape the adjudicative element of our justice system. It should
come as little surprise, then, that death also distorts the decision-
making process of the law firm that handles so many death row cli-
ents. This Comment will examine that organization, its decision-
making structure, and the host of problems which the capital pun-
ishment campaign posed for it, yet which seem neither to have con-
trolled, nor greatly influenced, nor possibly even occured to the law
firm which made the decision to attack.
II. Legal Defense Fund History, Principles, and Decisions
A. Historical Roots
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., has its
roots in the civil rights organization whose name it still bears. For
years, the NAACP-which included lobbying as one of its principal
activities-maintained its own internal legal department. In 1939,
however, new laws granting tax-exempt status to non-profit organi-
zations that did no lobbying prompted the NAACP to create a sepa-
rate organization which could handle its legal matters and enjoy the
tax break. 5 The separateness of this new organization allowed it "to
obtain new sources of income which could be devoted exclusively to
the legal program. ' ' 6 Furthermore, donations to the new organiza-
5. See M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 6.
6. L. HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 129 (1962).
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tion under the tax laws were tax-deductible. Thus on October 11,
1939, the LDF was formed as a membership corporation under the
laws of New York. A second and more definitive split between the
LDF and the NAACP came in the mid-1960s. A group of southern
senators obtained a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that
the two organizations could not have any common directors if the
Fund were to maintain its tax-exempt status. As a consequence, the
LDF's litigation activities acquired a completely independent status
and the two organizations divorced entirely. It is therefore impor-
tant not to be misled by LDF's name: the Fund is an organization
entirely distinct and independent from the NAACP, with its own
Board, staff, offices, budget, and agenda.
When the Legal Defense Fund was created, it consisted of one
man, Thurgood Marshall, and a budget no larger than his salary and
expenses. The LDF's budget in those early years barely topped
$10,000. By the early 1960s, the Fund had expanded to a corps of
five full-time lawyers and a budget exceeding $500,000. Marshall's
tenure as Director-Counsel lasted until his appointment to the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals in 1961, at which time Jack Greenberg
stepped in. The Legal Defense Fund has now blossomed into a New
York office, a Washington, D.C. office, field offices in four southern
states, and a full-time legal staff of twenty-three attorneys. This full-
time staff, however, does not fully describe the real reach of the
Fund: some four hundred cooperating attorneys, many of them inti-
mately involved in LDF affairs, are located nationwide. In addition,
associated with the Fund are
social scientists, educators, commercial lawyers, law professors, foun-
dation executives, corporation and government administrators, com-
munity workers, a Mexican-American legal defense fund, a law reform
unit that specializes in cases involving discrimination against the poor,
and a scholarship program.
7
It was the civil rights explosion of the 1960s that stimulated the
Fund's phenomenal growth. The expansion was supported finan-
cially by grants from the Ford Foundation and other private contrib-
utors; the LDF has never received aid from the government. Private
funding sources have therefore become increasingly indispensable
as the Fund has grown in size and scope. Indeed, by the late 1960s,
the Fund was establishing itself as one of America's giants in the
civil rights field-all on the goodwill of private contributors.
The sheer fiscal weight of LDF's broad litigation activities in the




civil rights fight indicates that the decision to attack capital punish-
ment ought to have caused LDF planners to worry about the ability
of their organization to withstand the added pressure. Michael
Meltsner, a staff attorney at the LDF during the planning stages of
the campaign, was aware of such concerns:
In the mid-1960s the LDF was ill-prepared to mount a systematic chal-
lenge to the procedures employed by the States to impose the death
penalty. Its New York staff was still small, spread dangerously thin,
and plagued by almost daily civil rights movement crises that required
immediate action.
8
Whether such concerns actually played a substantial role in the deci-
sion-making process remains to be seen.
B. Principles and Goals
During the forty-six years of LDF's history, a set of overarching
principles and goals has given shape to the Fund's litigation efforts.
Prior to the creation of the LDF, the NAACP's legal department
asked itself two questions before taking on any case:
1) Does the case involve a color discrimination?
2) Is some fundamental right of citizenship involved? 9
The NAACP would only consider involvement in litigation which
provided affirmative answers to both questions. As noted by the
Supreme Court, "[i]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is
not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for
achieveng the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all gov-
ernment, federal, state, and local, for the members of the Negro
community in this country."' 0
The corporate charter of the Legal Defense Fund echoes the
NAACP's goals of achieving democracy for the black American, but
sounds also in the special needs of the indigent. The document is
explicit in its purpose "to render legal aid gratuitously for such Ne-
groes as may appear to be worthy thereof, who are suffering legal
injustices by reason of race or color and are unable to employ and
engage legal aid and assistance on account of poverty."" Arthur B.
Spingarn, one of the Fund's founders, stated in his affidavit in sup-
8. Interview with Michael Meltsner, Professor of Law at Northeastern University
School of Law, in Boston, Massachusetts (Mar. 25, 1985).
9. L. HUGHES, supra note 6, at 123 (quoting M.W.OVINGTON, THE WALLS COME TUM-
BLING DOWN)
10. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1962).
11. Certificate of Incorporation of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(Oct. 11, 1939) (Available at the offices of the Legal Defense Fund, 99 Hudson Street,
New York, New York).
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port of the application for incoporation that "the proposed corpora-
tion does not intend to act as a general legal aid society," but will
handle only such cases which involve the rights of indigent blacks,
"and only in such instances where they are deprived of said rights
solely by reason of the fact that they are Negroes."' 12 Although the
LDF has never felt inflexibly bound by these pronouncements,' 3 the
Fund may well have been troubled by its broad attack on capital
punishment per se, insofar as the campaign pushed the Fund very
near to being a "general legal aid society" for all death row inmates.
The Legal Defense Fund, nevertheless, did broaden its reach con-
siderably beyond the specific provisions of its charter. In litigating
cases concerning race, the Fund occasionally became involved in
cases attacking discrimination based on gender, and in defending
the rights of the indigent, the Fund occasionally represented indi-
gent whites as well as indigent blacks. LDF lawyers, discovering
"that justice was a chain inescapably linking black and white,"' 4 also
found that "by helping black people, you helped white people
too." 5 Still, Jack Greenberg is adamant about the element which
has held together and given meaning to all LDF activities: "Race
was always the factor. There had to be a racial factor."' 16
C. Decisions and Strategies
Overarching principles such as those described above only ac-
quire meaning when they manifest themselves in the planning of
campaign strategy. The Legal Defense Fund's decision-making ap-
paratus works on two distinct and ostensibly separate, but in fact
intimately connected, planes. The formal, institutional dimension
includes the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee. The
Board, the LDF's formal governing body, is a seventy member
group, of whom roughly half are black. A majority are lawyers. The
principal function of this group's annual meetings is to ratify pro-
posals originating from the legal staff. The Board thus plays a com-
paratively minor role in charting the Fund's legal course. Still on
the formal plane but exercising greater planning authority is the six-
12. Affidavit of Arthur B. Spingarn in the matter of the application for the approval
of the certificate of incorporation of NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
(Nov. 2, 1939) (Available at the offices of the Legal Defense Fund, 99 Hudson Street,
New York, New York).
13. Interview with Jack Greenberg, Vice Dean of Columbia University Law School, in
New York City (Mar. 18, 1985).
14. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 5.





teen-member Executive Committee. This sub-group of the Board
meets monthly, and according to LDF Associate Counsel James
Nabrit, III, "is the formal organ which has substantial policy and
administrative control."'
7
The truly crucial decision-making, however, occurs more infor-
mally, involving both the legal staff and the cooperating attorneys.
Although policy guidance is formally vested in the Board of Direc-
tors and the Executive Committee, operational decisions on policies
and priorities are made by the legal staff. In practice, the decisions
of the legal staff must be informal and decentralized, since the Di-
rector-Counsel convenes no more than five meetings of the entire
staff per year. The staff, in turn, keeps an attentive eye on the litiga-
tion needs of the black community through close contact with the
cooperating attorney network.' 8 LDF decisions, then, are the prod-
uct of spontaneous and informal communication between the Direc-
tor-Counsel, members of the legal staff, and the cooperating
attorneys. The organization is truly marked "by an informal flow of
information and points of view, up, down, and horizontally."' 19
What emerges from this organizational structure is a sense of
friendly cooperation at a personal, rather than institutional, level.
The Board of Directors and Executive Committee are never too far
removed from staff brainstorming sessions because "the members
of the Board are close friends and associates." ' 20 Many of them are
also among the most active of the Fund's cooperating attorneys.
This personal emphasis in decision-making allows Jack Greenberg
to view the evolution of LDF strategy as "really the evolution of the
lives of the people who are in it. If the people who were the leaders,
and indeed the staff, had the sense that a certain course ought to be
pursued, and it looked workable, we did it."21 No elaborate confer-
ences were needed to make a decision, because "we were always
talking about one thing or another, including capital punishment. It
was a very personal process; more like a family than a law office." 22
17. Telephone interview with James M. Nabrit, III, Associate Counsel of the Legal
Defense Fund (Mar. 27, 1985).
18. The influence of these field attorneys cannot be underestimated: "The success
of the Fund's legal program was in large measure related to its ability to connect these
isolated attorneys to the lawyers and institutions which serviced the New York and
Washington liberal leadership." M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 8.
19. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
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III. The Campaign
The LDF's emphasis on a personal rather than an institutional ap-
proach to decision-making manifests itself vividly in the most acces-
sible account of its capital punishment campaign: Michael
Meltsner's Cruel and Unusual.- The Supreme Court and Capital Punish-
ment. Meltsner's recollections suggest that he and two LDF col-
leagues went to a delicatessen on their lunch hour, bought
sandwiches, and, between bites, decided to attack the imposition of
the death penalty for rape. The three young lawyers, prompted by a
recent dissent from denial of certiorari by Justice Goldberg which
invited the exploration of the constitutionality of the death penalty
for rape,23 spent their lunch hour wrangling both over Goldberg's
failure to mention possible racial discrimination in the imposition of
death sentences for rape, and over the difficulty of proving such dis-
crimination. One of the lawyers pointed out that the Fund received
a number of requests each month to represent black death row in-
mates. If the Fund could not turn these cases away, the lawyer re-
marked, it seemed reasonable "to focus on the real issue-capital
punishment." 24 Meltsner concludes his account of this momentous
lunchtime meeting:
Perhaps life was simpler in those days, or perhaps we were blinded by
the long string of civil rights victories the Fund had accumulated, but
[that] remark set our course. A week later we persuaded Greenberg
that a staff attorney should be assigned to investigate the possibility of
racial sentencing in rape cases, ... 25
This was more than the result of a decentralized and personal plan-
ning process; this was the makings of institutional chaos.
This was also, in the words of Jack Greenberg, "total non-
sense." 26 In fact, the Legal Defense Fund had a history of repre-
senting death row inmates which began at least fifteen years before
Meltsner's lunch meeting. Throughout that time period, LDF attor-
neys frequently debated the possibility of attacking the constitution-
ality of the death penalty on racial grounds.2 7 From 1950 through
1954, the LDF staff spent a large part of its time on the Groveland
Case, which involved a long string of appeals and collateral attacks
on the convictions and death sentences of two young black men for
23. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
24. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 31.
25. Id.





the rape of a white woman.28 Although the constitutionality of the
death penalty in rape cases was never argued in the Groveland Case,
the racially charged nature of the trial court proceedings precipi-
tated LDF involvement. Another early LDF capital punishment case
was Jones v. State,29 in which the black defendant's death sentence for
the rape of a white woman was allowed to stand even though the
defendant's lawyer was unaware of the victim's race until the mo-
ment she walked into the courtroom.
The Fund handled an even more shocking pre-campaign death
case, Hampton v. Commonwealth,30 the case of the Martinsville Seven.
Here the death sentences of seven black defendants for the rape of
one white woman were upheld in the Virginia Supreme Court. Sig-
nificantly, this case was the first in which lawyers assigned error on
appeal explicitly for racist elements in the state's imposition of the
death penalty for rape.3l The Virginia Supreme Court stated that
"there is not a scintilla of evidence in the records to support [this
claim of racism]," 3 2 and therefore rejected the argument with the
simple platitude that in Virginia, "the law applies to all alike, regard-
less of race or creed." 33
Finally, in another pre-campaign death case, the Fund was pre-
pared to advance an argument like the one advaced in Hampton v.
Commonwealth. In Hamilton v. Alabama,3 4 LDF lawyers succeeded in
obtaining a reversal of the defendant's conviction for breaking and
entering with intent to ravish, on the grounds that Alabama's failure
to accord him counsel at his arraignment violated his constitutional
rights. Jack Greenberg explains that "[at his] new trial we felt [it]
would be .. .appropriate . .. to raise two issues-(1) racial dis-
crimination in the imposition of the death penalty, and (2) cruel and
unususal punishment, because capital punishment was grossly un-
28. Shepherd v. State, 46 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1950), rev'd, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S.
50 (1951); Irvin v. State, 66 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954),
habeas denied sub nom., Irvin v. Chapman, 75 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
915 (1955).
29. 209 Ga. 685, 75 S.E.2d 429 (1953).
30. 190 Va. 531, 58 S.E.2d 288 (1950).
31. One of the errors assigned was the state's "sentencing petitioners, on account of
their race and color, to death, pursuant to the policy, practice, and custom of the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, to inflict the death penalty upon Negroes, because of their race
and color, convicted of rape upon white women, while failing and refusing to inflict the
death penalty upon white or any other persons convicted of rape of Negro women." 58
S.E.2d at 292.
32. Id. at 298.
33. Id. at 299.
34. 270 Ala. 184, 116 So.2d 906 (1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 852 (1960), 368 U.S. 52
(1961).
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fair when imposed in a case where no life had been taken and no
bodily harm had been inflicted." 35  The opportunity to present
these issues never arose, because the defendant received a life term
at his second trial. Significantly, though, Jack Greenberg and Jack
Himmelstein, two of the LDF attorneys who would later plot the
Fund's course in the broad attack on capital punishment per se, sin-
gle out this case as "the case which triggered our campaign.''36
Combined with LDF's long-standing opposition to racism in capi-
tal rape cases were several other factors which converged to precipi-
tate the initial "rape stage" of the campaign. Perhaps the most
concrete of these was Justice Goldberg's 1963 dissent from denial of
certiorari in Rudolph v. Alabama,3 7 a rape case involving a black rapist
and a white victim, in which the defendant neither took nor endan-
gered human life. Justices Brennan and Douglas joined Goldberg in
the dissent, which invited consideration of the constitutionality of
the death penalty for rape in light of the constitutional proscription
of cruelly excessive punishment, the decreasing use of the death
penalty in the United States and in foreign countries, and the possi-
ble excessiveness of a punishment of death for a crime which did not
endanger life. The Rudolph dissent thus indicated to Greenberg and
his staff that the arguments which they would have advanced on re-
trial in Hamilton v. Alabama were arguments worth making.
Conspicuously absent from Goldberg's dissent was any mention
of a possible racial influence in the imposition of the death penalty.
Yet this influence was what the LDF, still viewing the issue at this
early stage from its traditional racial standpoint, wished to highlight.
Thus Rudolph also alerted the Fund to a second matter: the LDF
would carry a heavy burden of proving a racial bias in the imposition
of the death penalty for rape. At roughly the same time, Marvin
Wolfgang, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, expressed his willingness to plan and assemble
the research necessary to show racism at work in rape sentencing.
Thus Wolfgang's commitment merged with the message of Rudolph
and the depth of the Fund's prior commitment to black death row
rapists to convince the Fund that the time for attack was ripe. Fur-
thermore, in considering whether and how to pursue the capital
punishment campaign, the Fund viewed each of the above factors
35. Greenberg & Himmelstein, Varieties of Attack on the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 112, 114 (1969).
36. Id. at 114.




against the sanguine backdrop of nearly two decades of civil rights
successes in the Supreme Court.
Each of these factors was an important element in the decision to
attack, but even Meltsner admits that "you can't pinpoint with preci-
sion when the decision happened."3 8 The decision flowed from a
long history of Fund involvement in cases where racial discrimina-
tion worked most invidiously. No group of staff lawyers reached the
decision over sandwiches; nor did Jack Greenberg write a memoran-
dum announcing that the LDF would attack the death penalty.39
Rather, the analogy which most accurately describes the decisional
process for the capital campaign is one in which weighty factors ac-
creted until a "critical mass" was finally reached. 40 The process of
accretion, however, began years before that mass finally obtained.
Having reached this critical mass, the Fund jumped into its battle
against the death penalty for rape with considerable alacrity and few
institutional concerns. Indeed, Greenberg and his staff had little to
be concerned about, for this first stage of the campaign did not lead
them far away from familiar Fund turf. "For a civil rights organiza-
tion like the Fund, elimination of racial discrimination was the first
priority." 4' A campaign to abolish a penalty for rape which had,
since 1930, chosen blacks as ninety percent of its victims turned so
unmistakably on racial issues that the Fund could justifiably con-
sider itself uniquely suited to handle the matter. In the words of
Associate Counsel James M. Nabrit, III, this part of the campaign
was "undeniably mainstream LDF." 42
As Wolfgang collected and assembled the data which were ex-
pected to reveal conclusive evidence of racism in sentencing pat-
terns for rape, LDF attorneys sought postponements for all rape
cases on appeal. Eventually, as data which clearly showed racism at
work became available, these attorneys used the statistics to bolster
their alternative demands for outright abolition of the death penalty
for rape or for new procedural safeguards to cleanse racism from
sentencing. The only perceived obstacle to the LDF's efforts during
this early stage was a vague recognition by some Fund attorneys that
the pursuit of the goal of abolition may not have been appropriate at
that time, given the High Court's somewhat tenuous position in the
38. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 73.
42. Telephone interview with James M. Nabrit, 1II, supra note 17.
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public eye after over a decade of activism.43 The Court had acted
bravely before, though, and the decline in executions through the
1940s and 1950s indicated that the death penalty might be falling
into public disfavor. The Legal Defense Fund pushed forward.
Before the LDF realized its goal of abolition of the death penalty
for rape,44 however, the force of abolitionist logic had pushed the
campaign far beyond its original scope. With two related cases of
broader impact before the courts,
45
the Fund's war council of capital case lawyers made a decision which
was to determine the path of their efforts for the next six years: hence-
forth they would attempt to block all executions. They would defend
murderers as well as rapists, whites as well as blacks, northerners as
well as southerners. 46
Michael Meltsner asserts that "[i]t is not easy to trace the evolution
of this change in policy," 47 but both the literature and interviews
with staff attorneys actually reveal unanimous agreement as to how
the change came about. The decision flowed from two very simple
matters of legal logic and professional ethics. As noted above, the
argument which most attracted the Fund to the issue of capital pun-
ishment for rape was the evidence of racism in southern rape sen-
tencing. Thus the Fund formulated arguments for a number of
procedural safeguards designed to eliminate racial influence in sen-
tencing. Once the Fund had taken on the fates of southern black
rapists, however, it was only logical to argue for these procedural
safeguards wherever such argument would fend off executions. The
very nature of these legal arguments called out for their broadened
application, even if courts chose to ignore or reject the racial claims
in granting the right to the procedural safeguards. Similarly, once
the Fund formulated a viable argument which attacked the imposi-
tion of death on Eighth Amendment grounds and which seemed to
43. Meltsner observes that "there were still plenty of good reasons to postpone a
campaign against the death penalty. The Court was in hot water because of its role in
the civil rights revolution. . . . 'Impeach Earl Warren' billboards covered Dixie like the
dew .... Even a Justice sympathetic to Goldberg's views [that the death penalty was
deserving of Supreme Court scrutiny] might have thought them too bold and adventur-
ous to act upon." M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 34.
44. The death penalty was declared grossly disproportionate and excessive punish-
ment for rape in violation of the Eighth Amendment in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
45. Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970)(a rape case, in which the LDF unsuccess-
fully sought greater procedural safeguards in capital cases to control untrammeled jury
discretion); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)(a robbery case, in which the LDF
unsuccessfully advanced for the first time an Eighth Amendment attack on capital pun-
ishment per se).





interest courts sufficiently for them to grant stays of execution while
they considered that argument, there was no ethical way of denying
it to any convict facing execution.
The logic of the abolitionist arguments and the ethics of litigating
the claims of a group of convicts so similarly situated as to constitute
a virtual class pushed the Fund far beyond its original racially based
commitment. Each of the lawyers involved in the campaign when it
was extended to all crimes and all defendants seize upon these twin
concerns of logic and ethics to explain the shift. Michael Meltsner
suggests that "once the lawyers knew the legal theories that could
win stays of execution, they felt morally obliged to use them" for all
death row convicts, regardless of race.48 James Nabrit, III, describes
the decision to broaden the campaign with a particularly apt
analogy:
One of the most frustrating things about the pre-moratorium stage
was the Fund's inability to represent all death row inmates who
needed representation. Our legal arguments created a lifeboat for
these people. Everybody was in the lifeboat, so LDF had an obligation
to help them all.
49
This agreement testifies to the persuasiveness of these logical and
ethical concerns in the minds of the campaign strategists.
LDF lawyers agreed not only on the potential benefits to be
gained from broadening the attack, but also on the possibly lethal
cost of such an expanded campaign. This cost was "the possible
submerging of special claims of individuals and groups such as
southern black rapists in a general effort including all persons sen-
tenced to death." 50 It is a well known phenomenon that a judge is
likely to scrutinize the special claims of an individual defendant in a
less hospitable light when the court is aware that the fates of many
similarly situated defendants hinge on that individual's case.5' Thus
it was a "close question" whether an individual Fund client would
truly be helped by "tying his fate to a general campaign against the
death penalty." 52 More significantly, the entire class of southern
black rapists- the class for whom the racial sentencing statistics
48. Id. at 108.
49. Telephone interview with James Nabrit, III, supra note 17. See Greenberg, Capital
Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 913 (1982)("Although the effort commenced
with rape cases, the non-racial issues raised were not by nature confined to such cases;
consequently, these issues were presented in all capital cases.)
50. JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 444 (. Greenberg, ed. 1977).
51. Address by John C. Boger, Assistant Counsel at the Legal Defense Fund, Yale
Law School seminar (Feb. 21, 1985).
52. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 107.
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were by far the most compelling and for whose benefit the Fund's
involvement had begun-might end up worse off than before if the
broad attack failed on broad grounds. "[A] general challenge to
capital punishment tended to lump together men who had killed
with men who had not, creating a situation in which the fate of the
nonkillers would be likely to hinge on the fate of the whole." 53 The
Fund, while aware of these possible dangers, nevertheless decided
to pursue the campaign on the larger scale. In the battle between
motivations and hesitations, motivations prevailed.
IV. Costs and Benefits
The statistically demonstrable racist tone of rape sentencing in
southern states called out for the involvement of the Legal Defense
Fund just as the racism of segregated schools and restrictive cove-
nants had in years past. Both the logic of the arguments which had
developed in response to racism in rape sentencing and the rigors of
legal ethics prompted the LDF's extension of those arguments to all
defendants, black and white, northern and southern, who stood a
chance to benefit from them. The logic behind the Fund's decision-
making, even in light of the avowed risk to southern black rapists,
thus seems virtually unassailable. The wisdom and propriety of the
decisions, however, is not so immune from questioning. Early aboli-
tionists not uncommonly worried about how the death penalty
should most convincingly and properly be attacked. 54 Indeed, a
number of concerns which ought to have troubled the LDF as it
planned its attack are conspicuously absent both from the scarce
literature on the LDF's decision-making process and from the
thoughts of the lawyers who were involved in planning the death
penalty campaign.
53. Id. at 108. In fact, a year did elapse between Gregg V. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976), which upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty, and Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held the death penalty unconstitutional for rape. This was a
year, then, in which these fears came to fruition.
54. Cf Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071 (1964).
Here, shortly after the appearance of the dissent in Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889
(1963) Stanford law professor Herbert Packer took Justice Goldberg to task for his de-
lineation of the constitutional questions pertinent to the death penalty for rape. Packer
first scolded Goldberg for assuming that the Constitution mandates proportionality be-
tween crime and punishment, and for implying that rape is qualitatively different, for the
purposes of punishment, than other crimes of violence. He pointed out that the aboli-
tion of the death penalty for rape on the grounds that no life was taken entailed a legi-
timization of the death penalty for an act that did take life. This, for Packer as an





An elementary question concerns the scope of the campaign. In a
1973 speech to the New York City Bar Association on the subject of
campaign litigation, Jack Greenberg identified the power of a cam-
paign to reach a large number of beneficiaries as one of the
hallmarks of campaign litigation:
While particular campaigns may involve a single or several test cases
planned and brought simultaneously or successively, the principal pur-
pose remains the same: judicial decision-making, especially in appel-
late courts, which will affect persons similarly situated who are not
themselves parties. 55
In this sense, the campaign of test cases culminating in Brown v.
Board of Education56 was exemplary. Here, the ruling touched the
lives of black schoolchildren in segregated school districts across the
country. Similarly, after the Supreme Court ruled in Shelley v. Krae-
mer 57 that the racially restrictive covenant was violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment, agreements all over the country which forbade
blacks from entering white neighborhoods were struck down. The
capital punishment campaign, however, if entirely successful, would
benefit only the approximately six hundred men then on the coun-
try's death rows. 58 More remote beneficiaries would be either fu-
ture defendants charged with what were at one time capital crimes
(assuming the abolition campaign entirely successful), or future cap-
ital defendants who could enjoy any improvements in capital trial
procedure (assuming the abolition campaign unsuccessful). This
difference in scale between the capital punishment campaign and
other classic campaigns may be a simple one, but it is striking
nonetheless.
A further observation along these lines concerns the degree of
control the Fund exercised over the range of beneficiaries its litiga-
tion was intended to reach at various stages in the campaign. Again,
the LDF maintained rigid control in its school desegregation cam-
paign over the class of litigants who would profit from a favorable
decision at any given stage. Fund strategists chose first to advance
the claims of only those blacks who sought equal graduate-level ed-
ucation, 59 steadfastly refusing to enlarge the scope of their claims to
55. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 9.
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
58. In 1971, shortly before the Court, in Furman, struck down the death penalty,
there were 642 men on death row. See generally, H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 47-64 (1982).
59. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 18.
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include the much larger group of elementary and high school stu-
dents who were suffering equal, or perhaps even more egregious,
wrongs. Similarly, although litigation planners were surely as out-
raged by the use of private restrictive covenants to exclude blacks as
by segregation ordinances, they restrained their efforts for years to
benefit only the victims of the latter form of discrimination. The
death penalty campaign saw no such restraint. Within two years of
the initial decision to render aid to all those facing execution for
rape, and without first seeing this initial task through to fruition, the
Fund had decided to broaden its objectives to include the cases of
all those facing execution for any crime.
B. Control
The issue of control over campaign litigation speaks to more than
the mere number of beneficiaries of the LDF campaign. Although
Jack Greenberg emphasizes that "too much that occurs in court is
not subject to control," 60 and Meltsner analogizes a lawyer's control
over a campaign to "riding a bucking horse," 6' there is no question
that the LDF and NAACP campaigns which have been well received
by the courts and lauded by observers have also been those over
which planners exercised a considerable degree of control. Yet the
campaign against capital punishment seemed to defy control at
every turn.
Jack Greenberg, in his 1973 speech, fleshed out the notion of
campaign litigation control in the following way:
If sequence is important, if adverse precedent is to be eroded in small
steps, perhaps based on records of great injustice, a degree of control
can be critical. An adverse precedent may be qualified slightly to do
justice in a limited case and several such decisions may leave the prece-
dent with little or no force.
62
The campaign against restrictive covenants sheds light upon this no-
tion. The general social ill which NAACP lawyers sought to remedy
was racial segregation in housing. Such segregation was enforced
through two mechanisms: segregation ordinances and private re-
strictive covenants. The easier mechanism to attack was the racially
restrictive ordinance, since the constitutional requirement of state
action was more readily apparent. Thus it was here that the lawyers
first attacked, successfully invalidating restrictive ordinances in
60. Id. at 10.
61. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.




Buchanan v. Warley, Harmon v. Tyler, and City of Richmond v. Deans.63
This last case spelled the demise of the racially restrictive ordinance,
for the Court there showed its resolve to invalidate restrictive ordi-
nances no matter how ostensibly harmless they appeared. Then,
and only then, did the lawyers begin to develop a theory which
would bar enforcement of private covenants as well. 64 Thus the
campaign divided itself into two deliberate stages.
The better-known litigation effort against segregated education
demonstrated an even greater emphasis on careful control than the
restrictive covenant campaign. Indeed, it was on this score that the
Brown campaign earned itself the designation of campaign litigation
"par excellence" by Jack Greenberg. 65 The adverse precedent
which lawyers whittled away was, of course, the holding in Plessy v.
Ferguson66 that statutorily mandated separate facilities for blacks and
whites did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At first, lawyers pursued a litigation strategy which de-
manded the fulfillment of Plessy's implicit promise of separate yet
truly equal facilities, thereby attempting to make segregation simply
too expensive to maintain. When it became clear that this approach
gave southern officials too much leeway to misdescribe facilities as
"equal," lawyers explicitly shifted their attack to challenging the le-
gality of segregation. However, they were careful to begin chipping
away along segregation's most obvious fault lines. The initial cases
thus attacked states' denials of graduate and professional education
to blacks when it was furnished to whites. 67 Although these cases
affected only a handful of people in each state, their significance was
great: "the marginal consequences of one or two students entering
a graduate school were not of sufficient immediate practical impor-
tance to warrant the effort; only long-term law-making was." 68
63. In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the Court invalidated a Louisville,
Kentucky restrictive ordinance; Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S 668 (1927), reinforced the
holding of Buchanan for the new crop of reworded ordinances which had sprung up in
Buchanan's wake. Finally, two years later, a restrictive ordinance based ostensibly on
racial intermarriage rather than race per se was also struck down in City of Richmond v.
Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
64. The theory which developed through subsequent cases was that court enforce-
ment of racially restrictive covenants was the requisite state action. See, e.g., Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Initially, however, lawyers refused to challenge the holding
of The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress could not penalize discrimination against blacks by private parties.
65. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 18.
66. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
67. University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md.2d 478, 182 A. 592 (1936); Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
68. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 18.
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The two LDF cases Sweatt v. Painter69 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents 70 took another measured step toward the ultimate goal
by inducing the Court to scrutinize the quality of the allegedly equal
graduate facilities which these states provided for blacks. 71 It is cru-
cial to note, as Greenberg does, that the "more difficult graduate
and professional school issues found in Sweatt and McLaurin . . .
were not presented until the groundwork had been established" in
the earlier cases.72 Finally, with an even stronger foothold estab-
lished, the LDF could advance the high school and elementary
school cases grouped under the name of Brown v. Board of Education
of Topeka, 73 in which the sixty-year-old rule of Plessy finally fell. This
ruling had been cultivated by years of careful planning and near
iron-clad control.74 Furthermore, the Fund attorneys were speaking
to a Court whose receptiveness to the claims they were advancing
they had stimulated and whose jurisprudence they had fostered.
The LDF's campaign against the death penalty showed little of the
sort of architectural planning which characterized the restrictive
covenant and education campaigns. The Fund found itself arguing
its hardest case before it had laid any of the necessary ground-
work.75 When the Fund entered the capital punishment area, the
Court had yet to take even a first step toward abolition.76 And when
69. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
70. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
71. The Court in both cases determined that separate was unequal in these in-
stances, but refused to advance to the proposition that separate could not constitution-
ally be equal. The issues in these two cases were quite tricky. In Sweatt, the liability
determination required close scrutiny of separate educational facilities provided for
blacks in the wake of a state court determination that such separate facilities were consti-
tutionally required. In McLaurin, a graduate student was admitted to the white facilities,
but was restricted in his classroom, library, and cafeteria seating.
72. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 21.
73. Briggs v. Elliot, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Davis v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, Gebhart v. Belton, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. "The lawyers who brought the cases had adequate financial resources and an
organizational base which could produce cases which presented the issues they wanted
decided, where and when they wanted them. . . . In essence, there was a large measure
of control, a substantial ability to influence the development and sequence of cases." J.
GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 20.
75. Meltsner notes this distinction in CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: "Observers of the War-
ren Court would have been surprised by a decision in the mid-1960s that the death
penalty was unconstitutional; the Supreme Court had not taken even its first step toward
abolition. By analogy, in 1938, sixteen years before Brown v. Board of Education doomed
the 'separate but equal' doctrine, the Court had chipped away at the legal foundation of
racial segregation" in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada. M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 66.
76. The meaning of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment had scarcely been unpacked by the Court. The principal cases prior to the capi-
tal campaign which attempted to give the Eighth Amendment meaning were five:
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878)(upholding the constitutionality of death by shoot-




the Fund decided to broaden the scope of the campaign to include
all death row inmates who sought LDF assistance, the Court still had
not taken an appreciable step toward abolition. Rather than await a
favorable holding on its easier rape claims, the Fund impatiently
went ahead with its much more difficult murder cases. In so doing,
the Fund may have deprived the Court of a chance to develop an
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence with which it could feel comforta-
ble.77 Meltsner points out that the Court often had opportunities to
address the Eighth Amendment claims early on in the campaign and
repeatedly ducked them. 78 This fact does not, however, make the
Fund's rush to litigate its hardest case appear any less precipitous.
Indeed, the decision to litigate for all death row inmates resembles
the abortive 1899 segregation case Cumming v. County Board of Educa-
tion,79 in which the plaintiffs sought to shut down the local white
high school when the Board of Education closed the local black high
school due to insufficient tax revenue. The plaintiffs, over fifty years
prior to Brown, were arguing for liability under a Brown-type ration-
ale, and for a remedy which even exceeded the scope of Brown. The
Court was entirely unpersuaded. Coming on the heels of the Plessy
ruling, Cumming argued for too much with too little precedent to
support it. The broadening of LDF's capital punishment campaign
seems almost equally untimely.
C. Public Relations
Another prominent consideration which the Fund all but ignored
in its decision to attack capital punishment was the "public educa-
tion" aspect of campaign litigation. Because the Fund has repeat-
edly been at the cutting edge of judicially encouraged or mandated
social change in this country, its efforts have often captured public
electrocution); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (striking down the penalty,
borrowed from the Spanish Penal Code, of lengthy imprisonment and deprivation of
rights for the crime of "misrepresentation of truth" as foreign to American traditions);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957)(striking down as cruel and unusual punishment the
penalty of loss of citizenship for desertion during wartime); Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962)(invalidating a statute which criminalized the status of narcotics
addiction).
77. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
78. This is no doubt true. Wherever possible, the Court disposed of capital cases on
the narrowest possible ground, without addressing the Eighth Amendment claims which
the LDF raised. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1969)(remanding to District
Court for inspection of the propriety of the exclusion of certain potential jurors); Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)(reversing conviction on involuntariness of plea); Mc-
Gautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)(making a Due Process, rather than an Eighth
Amendment, evaluation of capital trial procedure).
79. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
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attention. Jack Greenberg identifies public education as a principal
feature of social reform litigation:
These efforts do more than bring about judicial decisions. They may
stimulate legislation or bring about administrative reform. Publicized
law suits also spur public discussion of issues that might otherwise lie
dormant. So much so, that we sometimes hear it said, "I don't care
whether we win the case, it will educate the public."80
Although this function of litigation carries with it the obvious dan-
ger that the public might learn only that a crucial case was lost, pub-
lic response is an unavoidable feature of the LDF attorney's work.
Jack Greenberg nonetheless maintains that public interest liti-
gators must avoid overemphasizing the public education aspect of
their work.8l The history of LDF campaign work, however, has not
entirely confirmed Greenberg's observation. For example, some of
the common goals which Jonathon Casper discovered in his inter-
views with Fund staff attorneys involved in the civil rights demon-
stration cases in the 1960s were "to use litigation to teach their
communities lessons in tolerance, using the courts as a vehicle to
impress upon their fellow citizens the illegitimacy and immorality of
racial discrimination," and "to use the courts as a lever to influence
action by Congress." 8 2 Likewise, in the restrictive covenant cam-
paign, attorney Charles Houston emphasized that "we use the Court
as a forum for the purpose of educating the public on the question
of restrictive covenants because, after all, the covenants reflect a
community pattern."
8 3
Not surprisingly, public education was an avowed goal of the
school desegregation campaign as well. In the influential Margold
Report, a plan for the proper expenditure of funds granted to the
NAACP and earmarked for attacking racial discrimination in educa-
tion, author Nathan Margold observed that one important effect of
suits brought seeking equal facilities would be to "focus as nothing
else will public attention north and south upon the vicious discrimi-
nation in the apportionment of public school funds so far as Ne-
groes are concerned, in certain of [the] states."8 4 The LDF and the
NAACP thus mapped out each of these substantial projects with an
eye to the importance of public response.
This eye deliberately closed when the campaign against the death
80. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 10.
81. Interview with Jack Greenberg, supra note 13.
82. J. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN COURT 145 (1972).
83. C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY 60 (1967).




penalty began. Jack Boger, a staff attorney at LDF, candidly admits
that the Fund consciously disavowed any responsibility for the pub-
lic-relations ramifications of its advocacy. 85 The Fund's reluctance
to recognize that the capital punishment venture entailed serious
problems of public response most likely stemmed from the fact that
the project involved the most violent and distasteful group of clients
the LDF had ever known. Yet even this was a factor which other
LDF campaigns were able to incorporate. One of the darkest fears
of those opposed to the mixing of blacks and whites in the schools
was that academic interaction would lead to social interaction.
Thus, in choosing the case that would go to the Supreme Court
along with Sweatt v. Painter, Marshall gave careful consideration to
the attractiveness of the possible plaintiffs.8 6 Similarly, in the LDF's
fairly brief campaign to abolish the money bail system, one of the
most significant planning problems with which staff lawyers grap-
pled was how to find an inoffensive defendant. 87 The time con-
straints imposed by the procedural expedition of the cases of
defendants unable to make bail forced the Fund to advance a record
to the Court which was far from perfect; certiorari was denied and
the campaign foundered. 8
The possibility of choosing an appealing litigant was a luxury
which the planners of the capital punishment campaign could not
enjoy. As a group, their clients were the most violent, ugly, and
hated dropouts from American society. Of course, the Fund pre-
ferred to highlight the cases of the more sympathetic defendants
within that pool of clients. However, with death threatening on its
85. Letter from John C. Boger to Tracy Thompson (March 29, 1985)(discussing
public education aspects of the death penalty campaign).
86. "The Dixiecrats and the others said it was horrible. The only thing Negroes
were trying to do, they said, was to get social equality. As a matter of fact, there would
be intermarriage, they said. The latter theory was the reason we deliberately chose Pro-
fessor McLaurin. We had eight people who had applied and who were eligible to be
plaintiffs, but we deliberately picked Professor McLaurin because he was sixty-eight
years old and we didn't think he was going to marry or intermarry. . . . They could not
bring that one up on us, anyhow." Thurgood Marshall, quoted in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 266 (1977).
87. "That the indigents involved in the litigation would necessarily be accused of
criminal offenses led LDF lawyers to attach great significance to finding what might be
called an attractive defendant; . . .the facts of the crime were not to inflame emotions;
. . .the defendant should not have a long record, especially not one involving inflam-
matory crimes or crimes of violence." J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 33.
88. See People ex rel. Gonzalez v. Warden, 21 N.Y.2d 18, 286 N.Y.S.2d 240, 233
N.E.2d 265 (1967)(holding that the adoption of nonfinancially oriented bail system was
more within the province of the legislature than the courts, and that the court did not
abuse its discretion in setting bail at $1000), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1967); See alsoJ.
GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 31-35.
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own schedule, without regard for the attractiveness of its victims,
Fund attorneys were generally prompted more by an impending ex-
ecution date than a sympathetic character in plotting the campaign's
next steps. An excellent example of this was the group of cases de-
cided under the name Furman v. Georgia.8 9 The case originally slated
to head this group of cases was Aikens v. California.90 Aikens was, in
Meltsner's words, "an absolute monster;" he was convicted of the
brutal rapes and murders of two women, and linked to a third rape
and murder. After oral argument on these cases in the United
States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court retroactively
struck down the California death penalty statute as violative of the
state constitution. 9' This removed Aikens from the Supreme Court
for mootness, 92 leaving Furman, a case involving a more sympathetic
defendant, as the head case. Meltsner says that the LDF staff
heaved a collective sigh of relief when Anderson was decided in Califor-
nia and Aikens dropped out, because some of the Justices, especially
Burger, and the public at large, probably would have made a great
deal of hay out of the heinousness of Aikens' crimes. 93
The turn of events in California may have been fortunate for the
Fund and for the campaign's public image, but it was also entirely
fortuitous. The Aikens affair suggests a litigation campaign more in
control of its planners than its planners of it.
Another issue related to the public aspect of the campaign which
might have given the LDF decision-makers a moment's pause was
the possibility of a backlash of public opinion. As Meltsner observes
in Cruel and Unusual, the history of the 1950s and 1960s was to some
extent the story of white America coming to terms with its own in-
volvement in the creation of racial stereotypes, among which figured
prominently the notion of "black criminality.- 9 4 The Fund's re-
peated seeking of stays of execution for the most violent black
criminals may have served to reinforce such racist notions. The liti-
gation and relitigation of the claims of rapists and murderers
paraded vicious black offenders across the front pages of America's
newspapers. Such exposure undoubtedly focused the attention of a
substantial portion of white America more on the heinousness of
these defendants' offenses than on the injustice of their treatment.
89. Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)(striking down the death penalty as it was being applied by the states).
90. cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 813 (1972).
91. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152 (1972).
92. 406 U.S. 813 (1972).
93. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.




As Hugo Bedau has observed, the movement for judicial abolition
of the death penalty "in the absence of public clamor for legislative
repeal . . . fed the fires of middle class anxiety as well as racist
resentment."9 5
Even if, as Greenberg suggests, public education was not a con-
trolling factor in Fund decision-making, these negative media effects
were regrettable, and insofar as they were foreseeable to LDF plan-
ners, they were risks that merited consideration. Indeed, since the
risk was high that the campaign would create potentially inflam-
matory publicity, the need for effective public education was corre-
spondingly great. In an interview for this Comment, Jack
Greenberg asserted quite straightforwardly that the LDF did not
worry about this backlash effect; when asked to comment, he
claimed that it was "the first time [he had] ever heard of it."96 Fur-
thermore, he explained, these murder and rape cases were already
as well publicized as they were going to be. LDF's involvement ad-
ded little to the amount of press coverage they received.
That this was the first time Greenberg had heard of the risk of
backlash from the capital punishment campaign is indeed surpris-
ing. After all, strategists involved in other campaigns made fre-
quent reference to this very danger. For example, in the Margold
report, a plan for the proper expenditure of NAACP funds
earmarked for attacking racial discrimination, the author explicitly
warned of "the danger of stirring up intense opposition, ill-will and
strife as a result of any attack upon a custom so deeply entrenched
in popular prejudice as is the segregation of races in public
schools."9 7 It is perhaps more accurate to say, as do Michael Melt-
sner and Jack Boger, that the Fund simply did not consider the diffi-
cult task of public education on the death penalty issue as one of its
important responsibilities. Meltsner asserts that litigating lawyers
properly see their role as developing strategies and winning cases,
and that any public education which occurs "must play off of
that."98 Jack Boger also points out that the Fund has always seen
95. H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 89 (1977).
96. Interview with Jack Greenberg, supra note 13.
97. N. Margold, Preliminary Report to the Joint Committee Supervising the Expen-
diture of the 1930 Appropriation by the American Fund for Public Service to the
NAACP, reprinted inJUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 50, at 56. Margold
goes on to advise that, with carefully planned strategy, "accompanied by extensive, care-
fully supervised publicity, I feel certain that the danger of inciting ill-will and alienating
enlightened public opinion can be reduced far below the point where it is outweighed by
the ultimate goal to be accomplished." Id. at 57.
98. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
179
Yale Law & Policy Review
itself as a law office rather than a lobbying organization, in part due
to the fact that the parent NAACP retained all lobbying responsibili-
ties when it and the Fund severed ties. 99 These explanations for the
Fund's failure to concern itself with educating the public do not al-
ter the fact that the campaign ran the risk of stirring up considerable
hostility, or the fact that the Fund was traditionally quite attentive to
like risks in other areas.
D. Institutional Integrity
The LDF's campaign against capital punishment also posed a
number of seemingly unaddressed difficulties to the Fund as an in-
stitution. These problems, insofar as they spoke directly to the very
nature and character of the Fund and its activities, were issues of
even greater concern than the strategic problems suggested above.
The most obvious of these institutional quandaries concerned prac-
tical issues of fundraising and the budget. The LDF had become a
very diverse and expansive litigation organization by the time it
committed its energies and assets to saving death row inmates. It
operated on money from private contributors alone. The death
penalty campaign taxed the Fund's tight budget in two distinct ways.
The more apparent of these budgetary strains was the expense of
financing the litigation and the social science research which sup-
ported it. The other, more subtle cost incurred by the campaign
was its inherent inability to elicit contributions. "Capital punish-
ment," Meltsner laconically points out, "is not a big money-
raiser." lO
Unlike the battle against restrictive covenants, for which flyers
were circulated imploring potential contributors to "JOIN NAACP
$50,000 CAMPAIGN TO BREAK RACE RESTRICTIVE COVE-
NANTS . . . NAACP IS LEADING THE FIGHT,"'' the capital
punishment campaign did not bring in money to support itself. Of
course, Greenberg notes that within broad limits, campaign lawyers
are free to pursue their own ideas, "not influenced a great deal with
regard to particulars by the constituencies they have chosen or
which have chosen them, and affected little or not at all by contribu-
tors." 10 2 Furthermore, contributors and Fund lawyers "usually
share a common social outlook" according to James Nabrit, III, who
180
99. Letter from John C. Boger to Tracy Thompson, supra note 85.
100. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
101. C. VOSE, supra note 83, at 71.
102. J. GREENBERG, supra note 3, at 38.
Vol. 4:158, 1985
Legal Defense Fund
remembers no substantial disagreement among LDF Board mem-
bers and contributors regarding the goals of the campaign.' 03 The
LDF's commitment to abolition of the death penalty nonetheless in-
volved it ever more deeply in a campaign which drained its coffers,
yet did little to replenish them.
Coupled with these practical worries about financial matters were
more theoretical concerns about the nature of the Fund's commit-
ment. The death penalty campaign tucked under the Fund's protec-
tive wing defendants who were not only white, but culled from the
most racist segment of white society. From 1968 through 1972,
nearly half of the inmates on death row were white.' 0 4 This alone
was unusual in terms both of LDF's history and of its charter.
Michael Meltsner describes this tension in these words:
Look, this was a civil rights organization. Its contributors and staff
and constituency were there to represent black people. The clients we
were representing at the broadened stage would have been drawn
from the most racist segment of the society. It's to the credit of the
organization that it never let things like that stand in its way.
10 5
Such representation was, beyond doubt, to the organization's moral
credit. However, such representation also clashed considerably with
the Fund's thirty years of institutional development as a law firm
litigating the claims of black people. More specifically, it clashed
with the Fund's own historical involvement in the death penalty
area. 10 6 The Fund's handling of all death row inmates who sought
assistance also left the Fund looking remarkably like the general
legal aid society which founder Arthur Spingarn had sworn it would
never become. 1
07
Furthermore, the capital punishment campaign's logic distorted
the Fund's traditional focus on the treatment of the black American.
Although the Fund's involvement at first stressed traditional issues
of racial discrimination, non-racial formulations soon crept into the
campaign's arsenal. By the time Greenberg and his staff had de-
cided to realign their attack toward the goal of full abolition of the
death penalty, it had become difficult to determine whether, at very
bottom, it was the mere presence of racism in the capital process, or
the ominous possibility of death at the end of that process, which
was truly propelling the campaign. To any observer, race had al-
103. Telephone Interview with James M. Nabrit, III, supra note 17.
104. An average of 46% of all death row inmates throughout this period were white.
See, H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 63 (1982).
105. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
106. See supra notes 9 to 16 and 25 to 41 and accompanying text.
107. Affidavit of Arthur B. Spingarn, supra note 12.
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ways been the top issue on the Fund's agenda; now race stood to be
either submerged within, or entirely eclipsed by, the larger issue of
a state's power to kill certain of its citizens:
[L]urking in the background of each case was the awareness that what
was at stake was not merely justice, not just the legal standards that
evolve out of new situations, not simply the number of individuals af-
fected, but the irreversible fact of death.' 08
Suddenly the Fund was spending a good part of its time talking
about moral and philosophical issues it had never dealt with before.
It was advancing arguments which, although supported by social sci-
ence data, really pushed beyond racism to more basic moral ques-
tions of life, death, and the power of the State. Although the LDF
continued to offer racial data to rationalize a pro-abolitionist deci-
sion, the campaign also invited judges to reach the deeper moral
dilemma independently of the racial statistics.
The obvious reply to this observation is that the imposition of the
death penalty so intertwines racism and death that the two cannot
meaningfully be separated. This is certainly the case if one accepts
the Fund's statistics and believes that no death penalty statute can
ever be written to wring racism out of the system. However, to ac-
comodate those who either do not accept these statistics, do not ap-
preciate their thrust, or do not hold such high expectations for the
procedure which sends people to the electric chair, non-racial for-
mulations must also be advanced. Indeed, these non-racial argu-
ments, by engaging more fundamental questions about criminal
justice and human worth, invite disinterest in the racial claims. Sig-
nificantly, the Court's opinion in the LDF case which finally declared
the death penalty unconstitutional for rape nowhere mentions race. 09
Clearly, this campaign placed the LDF in an unusual position with
respect to the issue that it, as an institution, has traditionally
deemed most important.
The death penalty campaign also placed the Fund in an unusual
position as to the future of progressive lawyering and rule-making in
the criminal justice system. The types of relief prayed for in the
campaign-extraordinary stays of execution, greater opportunity
for collateral attack than in non-capital cases, enhanced procedural
108. Greenberg & Himmelstein, supra note 35, at 112.
109. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) Rather than address the racial data on
rape sentencing, the Court in Coker rested its decision on the grounds that the Eighth
Amendment forbids punishment which is excessive in relation to the crime committed,
that the death penalty for crime which does not take life is excessive, and that rape of an




safeguards for capital defendants, abolition of the penalty itself-all
turned crucially on the notion that death is different from all other
constitutionally permissible punishments. The difference between
ten and fifty years in prison is a difference in degree; the difference
between life imprisonment and death is a difference in kind. Thus
although we might accept mistake, racism, and imperfection in the
non-capital portion of the criminal justice system, the argument im-
plied, that system should meet more rigorous standards when it de-
cides to take somone's life.
This argument placed the LDF in two perplexing conceptual
binds. First, even a successful attack on the penalty which gave birth
to new safeguards in capital trial procedure could effectively fore-
close any extension of such changes back down the rungs of the
criminal justice system. For if the argument which sparked such in-
novation was that death is different, courts would surely be reluctant
to grant similar relief where death is not threatened. In fact, Green-
berg recalls that the Fund actually felt the pinch of this bind:
After we won Furman there were efforts to extend the Furman rationale
beyond capital punishment. They wern't really very extensive efforts,
because people were busy litigating the cases that went up in Gregg v.
Georgia. But there were efforts. They got absolutely nowhere."10
In this respect, the Fund's logic was germane to this campaign alone
and therefore hardly instrumental to broader goals of change in the
criminal justice system.
Furthermore, if it is safe to consider the Fund's broadest aim in
the criminal justice system to be the eradication of racism from that
system's administration, then there is something intellectually dis-
turbing about advancing arguments which implicitly condone the in-
fluence of racism anywhere in that system. This is, however,just the
position which the Fund found itself suggesting in the campaign.
The argument that "death is different" had the unfortunate and un-
intentional entailment that racism might be tolerable where death is
not a possible penalty. In some sense, the Fund's commitment to
the capital punishment campaign brought about a silent yet total
abandonment of its general policy goals in the criminal justice sys-
tem. That a law firm so committed to cleansing the American legal
order of racist considerations should advance a theory so potentially
at odds with its own institutional orientation is quite curious. And
that that law firm should do so with so little visible strain or discom-
110. Interview with Jack Greenberg, supra note 13.
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fort (as evidenced in writings of, and conversations with, its lawyers)
is truly perplexing.
V. Death Is Diferent
Capital punishment involved the Legal Defense Fund in a type of
campaign which that organization had never before encountered.
The capital project elicited a larger investment of time and money
for a smaller group of clients than had other traditional Fund activi-
ties. It also allowed the Fund little control over either the selection
of the clients it would assist or the appropriate moment at which to
provide that assistance. It forced the LDF to rush ahead in advanc-
ing its arguments in a way that no controlled campaign had done
before. In so doing, the campaign denied the Fund's planners an
opportunity to create a favorable judicial attitude toward the Fund's
more daring and controversial claims. And it elicited an un-
characteristic insensitivity to the ability of campaign litigation either
to educate a receptive public or horrify a hostile one.
Furthermore, the capital punishment campaign placed institu-
tional strains on the Fund which were as unprecedented as the
above strategic concerns, and possibly more troublesome. It
drained the Fund's budget, but was not itself appealing enough to
excite potential contributors. The capital project garnered as bene-
ficiaries of the Fund's efforts nearly as many whites as blacks. Fi-
nally, it forced the LDF to advance and rely heavily on arguments
which had no obvious or intimate connection with racial issues, and
which in fact not only inhibited further reform of the criminal justice
system, but actually implied acceptance of racism in the overwhelm-
ing majority of criminal cases.
The institutional significance of these concerns cannot be over-
stated. Within the space of a few years, a single issue wrenched the
Fund's law-making and policy-making goals from their traditionally
parallel tracks, twisting them until they neared direct opposition. By
the time of Furman, the Fund could entertain no serious hope that
the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence would in-
clude a position on racism and criminal justice with which the Fund
could feel comfortable. In fact, LDF could expect only that the
Court would either accept an argument that racism was constitu-
tionally intolerable only in death penalty cases, or ignore the insidi-
ous work of racism even in the death penalty area. The Court chose
the latter option, and the Fund has ever since had to struggle to




rect."I The argument might be made that the Fund's core commit-
ment was to eradicating racism, even if the legal arguments
designed to achieve the eradication engaged other issues. This was
undoubtedly true in the hearts and minds of LDF attorneys. Yet a
reading of the case law which the campaign developed not only con-
ceals this motivation behind other weighty issues, but denies the
motivation entirely in the non-capital criminal justice system.
Why, then, did the Fund take on a campaign involving such
strains and risks? Why, once the effort had begun, did the Fund not
tailor its involvement to address or avoid them? The easiest expla-
nation for the Fund's involvement-and the explanation which first
comes to the minds of Fund attorneys-is that the LDF was the only
organization willing or even able to undertake the advocacy. " 2 In-
deed, only the ACLU and the LDF were sufficiently large and organ-
ized in the mid-1960s to handle a broad attack on capital
punishment, and until 1965 the ACLU denied that capital punish-
ment presented "a civil liberties issue."'" 3
Even accepting, however, the above explanation for the fact of
LDF involvement, the larger question concerning the unprece-
dented nature of LDF's developing involvement remains. The an-
swer lies in the twisting, distorting, and corroding effect of death.
In the adjudicative segment of the criminal justice system, the spec-
ter of death which pervades the capital trial shatters procedural
rules which pass muster in non-capital cases, distorts conventional
doctrines of substantive criminal law which seem clear on a textbook
page, and charges judges and juries with an emotionalism and an
uneasiness unknown to the non-capital courtroom. Not surpris-
111. In McClesky v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1985), the Eleventh Circuit en banc consid-
ered the state-of-the-art statistical evidence on racial influences in the imposition of the
death penalty. Accepting for the purposes of argument that the statistics were valid, the
Eleventh Circuit held these statistics insufficient as a matter of constitutional law to show
that Georgia's death penalty law was administered in an arbitrary and capricious man-
ner, even though "the statistics show there is a race-of-the-victim relationship with the
imposition of the death sentence discernible in enough cases to be statistically signifi-
cant in the system as a whole." 753 F.2d at 897. The statistics also show that "in a
group involving blacks and whites, all of whose cases are virtually the same, there would
be more blacks receiving the death penalty than whites and more murderers of whites
receiving the death penalty than murderers of blacks." 753 F.2d at 895. Since this sta-
tistical evidence tended to show only a racial effect and not a racial motive, the court
reasoned, it revealed no defect of constitutional magnitude.
112. In Michael Meltsner's words, written in 1973, "[o]nly recently have lawyers as-
sociated in numbers to bring court cases in a systematic attempt to change the character
of American institutions. The ranks of defense funds, public interest law firms, commu-
nity law offices, and legal centers which now readily challenge corporate and govern-
mental conduct. . .were almost empty ten years ago." M. MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 4.
113. Id. at 54.
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ingly, this specter of death affects lawyering much as it does adjudi-
cating. Michael Meltsner explains the distortion in LDF decision-
making with a very telling reference:
We couldn't win any other way. With people who stood to be exe-
cuted, we weren't willing to commit ourselves to a forty year strategy.
Brown v. Board of Education was fine, but it took a little too long for a
scenario where people were getting executed.1 14
With clients who stood to be executed, then, the Fund simply could
not commit itself to the kind of controlled and reasoned campaign it
normally pursues. Death would not allow that.
This distortion of normal LDF functioning is not only an unmis-
takable effect of the capital punishment campaign, it is also wholly
understandable. One senses that the lawyers who planned the cam-
paign, facing daily the possibly lethal consequences of their deci-
sions, acted as much out of human instinct as lawyer's instinct."t 5
The intensely personal, intimate, and spontaneous decision-making
structure of the LDF only indulged such human and personal re-
sponses to the task at hand. Indeed, in a law firm where the evolu-
tion of strategy reflects the evolution of the lives of the people in
that firm, 1'6 personal responses to perceived injustices must carry a
weight in the decision-making process directly proportional to the
fervor of those responses.
Although the effect of the distortion of death on the Legal De-
fense Fund was understandable, a separate question is whether that
effect was justified. To attempt an answer to this question is to en-
gage in speculation: How might the Fund have handled the cam-
paign differently? Had the Fund waited for Coker' 17 to advance its
murder cases, Furman might have attracted five Justices to the idea
of wholesale abolition, rather than only two. Or, even if not abolish-
ing capital punishment outright, Furman might have produced a co-
herent Eighth Amendment condemnation of the statutes as applied,
rather than the nine-opinion mess it turned out to be. The Fund
might have formalized its decision-making structure, measuring the
developing capital campaign either against its own history or against
a uniform set of criteria. Removing the decision-making process
from the intimacy of close personal interaction and dissecting the
114. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
115. In CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, Meltsner observes that "at bottom, the lawyers who
decided to challenge the death penalty acted as much for themselves and for the order
of things they wished to call into being as for the condemned." supra note 1, at 36.
116. Interview with Jack Greenberg, supra note 13.




decision in a more clinical way might have sensitized the LDF more
effectively to the implications of its advocacy. Finally, individual
Fund attorneys setting LDF policy might have made a greater effort
to balance the demands of campaign law-making with the emotion
inherent in capital representation. These proposals are, however,
mere conjecture, and conjecture alone cannot suffice to applaud or
condemn the actions of lawyers acting frantically to save human
lives.
That the campaign against the death penalty showed less of the
careful counting of costs and benefits which marked other LDF ef-
forts was thus unquestionably understandable, even if only arguably
justifiable. Jack Greenberg, explaining the LDF's involvement,
stresses that "people thought that capital punishment was suffi-
ciently horrible. . .that you just didn't have to count up the num-
bers."' "I Meltsner echoes these thoughts, emphasizing the intimacy
of the process:
I think for me personally, there was never any question that I wasn't
making neat and nice distinctions in a cost-benefit sense. Once you
were involved with representing people on death row, you did it until
you dropped. The greatest good for the greatest number was a factor,
but only one of many. More important was just the kind of person I
was. I19
Deborah Fins, a current LDF staff member, cannot avoid the use of
military imagery to express her, and LDF's, commitment. Perhaps,
she observes, there are some litigators who are like army generals,
sending off battalions of troops to their certain deaths for the sake
of the general war effort. If this is so, she concludes, "then I'm just
not a general."' 20 In this sense, the tragedy of the capital punish-
ment campaign was that it would not allow the Fund to go into bat-
tle in its customary array-as a finely trained corps of generals.
-Eric L. Muller
187
118. Interview with Jack Greenberg, supra note 13.
119. Interview with Michael Meltsner, supra note 8.
120. Address by Deborah Fins, Assistant Counsel at the Legal Defense Fund, Yale
Law School seminar (Feb. 21, 1985).
